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1 Introduction
The smooth operation of government bond trading is the backbone of developed financial
markets. The rates of the yield curve serve as benchmarks in many financial transactions,
they affect government financing costs and play an important role for the implementation of
monetary policy. Hence, understanding how this market operates is of critical importance.
The classic view of government bond market activity is that variation in interest rates is
mainly due to public information flow. According to this view, public news lead to instan-
taneous adjustments of the yield curve, and trading activity is the outcome of subsequent
rebalancing. Since Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999) there has been accumulating evi-
dence that part of the price discovery in government bond markets occurs through trading
activity. This suggests that clients and dealers have heterogeneous private information (or
heterogeneous interpretation of public information) which is aggregated through trading,
leading to changes in the yield curve.
In this paper, we contribute to this evidence by presenting three new empirical results.
First, we identify a proxy for the variation in clients’ private information in government bond
markets. In particular, we show evidence that the time-variation in a client’s connectedness,
that is, the variation in the number of dealers with whom a client is trading within a given
time-period, works well as such a proxy. Second, using this insight, we characterise the
nature of private information the client is relying on. We find that informed clients forecast
and trade against the composition of their own dealers’ order flow. For example, these clients
rebalance their trades towards short maturity assets a few days before their dealers receive
orders predominantly for short maturity assets. Third, we find that these informed clients
forecast the order flow of dealers that they have a regular relationship with, and not the order
flow of newly connected dealers, suggesting that information flows from regular connections
and not from new connections. These results are consistent with our proposed theoretical
framework where connectedness serves as an instrument of concealing information (rather
than playing an active role in the information acquisition process).
For our analysis, we exploit the structure of the UK gilt market and a detailed, transaction-
level proprietary database. Conventional gilts are trading via primary dealers, usually re-
ferred to as gilt-edged market makers. Whenever clients (including foreign central banks,
commercial banks, asset managers amongst others) trade these assets, they do so almost
exclusively by trading with a dealer. Interestingly, there is a significant time-variation in the
number of dealers with whom a given client trades across months and even across trading
days. The basic premise of our paper is that this time-variation can help us learn about the
nature of the relevant private information in this market. Using a simple model in the spirit
of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), we explore the idea that trading with more dealers may
be advantageous because it helps the client hide her private information. This, however,
requires the client to reach out for quotes from more dealers, which is costly. Therefore,
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the client will do so only when the benefit of hiding information is sufficiently large, that is,
when her information is sufficiently precise. In these periods, the client should overperform.
To illustrate the viability of this idea, we first analyse trading around the Brexit referen-
dum. Based on public polls, the chances of a leave or a remain outcome were close to 50-50
leaning slightly towards remain immediately before the vote. The common perception was
that a leave outcome would likely trigger a fall in interest rates, leading to an immediate
downward shift in the yield curve on 24 June. Given the large uncertainty before the vote,
market participants were motivated to either reduce their exposure radically, or to generate
private information and bet on the outcome.1 In line with our hypothesis, we show that
a change in their number of dealer connections helps identify the client group with private
information. In particular, the group of clients who were connected with more dealers on
the day before the referendum persistently increased the duration of their positions for days
before the referendum and, subsequently, outperformed other clients when the yield curve
dropped on 24th of June.
Then we turn to systematic evidence. Most importantly, we should observe that when
clients are connected to more dealers, their trades are more profitable. This effect should
not be driven by smaller price impact, but by forecasting future price movements. That
is, the price of gilts that clients buy in these periods should increase in subsequent days
compared to the price of gilts that they sell. We also expect these differential effects to
be more pronounced in more information sensitive periods, for example, around important
macroeconomic announcements. We find empirical evidence for each of these predictions.
We go further and search for the source of private information captured by the time-
variation in clients’ connectedness. First, we show that trades which predict the maturity
structure of market makers’ total order flow are profitable. That is, it would be valuable
for clients to be able to predict this maturity structure, because whichever maturity market
makers sell, the price of the given bonds tend to go up. Then, we check whether clients
can actually predict that. In particular, we look for co-movement between the maturity
structure of connected client’s trades and that of various segments of the market makers’
order flow a few days later. We find that whenever the client is connected, the structure of
her trades predict the part of the order flow which goes through the given client’s primary
dealers. However, she cannot predict the structure of the order flow which goes through other
dealers. This suggests that a client becomes more connected when obtains information about
1Reportedly, major hedge funds ordered private opinion polls to generate an informational edge for this
bet and earned handsomely on those bets:
“Behind the scenes, a small group of people had a secret – and billions of dollars were at stake. Hedge
funds aiming to win big from trades that day had hired YouGov and at least five other polling companies [...].
Their services, on the day and in the days leading up to the vote, varied, but pollsters sold hedge funds critical,
advance information, including data that would have been illegal for them to give the public. Some hedge
funds gained confidence, through private exit polls, that most Britons had voted to leave the EU, or that the
vote was far closer than the public believed – knowledge pollsters provided while voting was still underway and
hours ahead of official tallies.” ( “The Brexit Short: How Hedge Funds Used Private Polls to Make Millions”,
Bloomberg Businessweek, 25th June, 2018)
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the maturity of her dealer’s future order flow.
In addition, we show that the predictable part of the order flow is intermediated by
those dealers that the client traded with not only on the day of increased connectedness
(and of profitable trades) but during the preceding trading days as well. In contrast, the
order flow of newly connected dealers is not predicted by informed clients, suggesting that
connectedness merely helps transform private information into higher returns by concealing
information (as in our model) instead of playing an active role in the information acquisition
process. A limitation of our analysis is that we cannot observe whether the client is gathering
information from the quotes she receives from her dealers, or dealers leak the information
to its best clients.
Related Literature There is a growing empirical literature focusing on the role of dealer-
client network in financial markets.2 For example, Li and Schurhoff (2014) and Hollifield,
Neklyudov, and Spatt (2017) study whether clients, trading with more central dealers, face
higher or lower spreads. Gabrieli and Georg (2014) and Maggio, Kermani, and Song (2017)
focus on the effect of the trading network on the transmission of shocks. Both highlight that
the failure of a core dealer causes the connected dealers to change their pricing functions
and to become less profitable. The recent work of Maggio, Franzoni, Kermani, and Som-
mavilla (2018), perhaps most related to our paper, analyses the broker-client network of a
centralized stock-exchange, and argues that clients with more connected brokers are making
more informed trades. A key difference between these papers and ours is that we focus on
the time-variation in client connectedness rather than relying mainly on the cross-sectional
variation in the centrality of dealers. Moreover, we separate the effect of client connectedness
on the execution cost from the effect on the ability to predict price movements.
Our paper is also related to the large empirical literature on price discovery (Hasbrouck
1991; Evans and Lyons 2002) in financial markets. A partial list of papers focusing on
government bond markets includes Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999), Balduzzi, Elton,
and Green (2001), Green (2004), Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold,
and Vega (2007), Pasquariello and Vega (2007), Valseth (2013) amongst others. We add
to this literature by showing that variation in client connectedness is related to the price
discovery process in the UK gilt market. We are able to do so due to the important feature
of our dataset that for each trade we can observe the identity of both parties. This allows
us to map out the market’s network structure and to explore its links with the process of
price discovery.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the environment, concepts
and hypothesis illustrated by the example of financial betting around the Brexit referendum;
2There is a related, growing theoretical literature on financial trading in networks, such as Veldkamp,
Lucca, and Boyarchenko (2017), Condorelli, Galeotti, and Renou (2017), Choi, Galeotti, and Goyal (2017),
Malamud and Rostek (2017), Manea (2018) and Babus and Kondor (2018) amongst others.
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Section 3 describes the data sources and provides summary statistics; Section 4 presents the
empirical results on using client connectedness as a proxy for private information; Section 5
explores the nature of private information; Section 6 concludes.
2 Concepts, Hypotheses and Betting on Brexit
We start this section with a basic description of the micro-structure of the UK gilt market.
Then, with the illustration of a simple model, we discuss our main hypotheses. Finally, we
illustrate the viability of these hypotheses by taking a closer look at the gilt trading activity
around the Brexit referendum.
2.1 Primary Dealers in the UK Gilt Market
The key actors in the UK gilt market are the primary dealers, also known as gilt-edged
market markers (GEMMs). In our sample period between 2011 and 2017, their number
fluctuates between 20 and 24. From now on, we refer to this group as dealers. The UK Debt
Management Office (DMO) tenders new issues of government securities to dealers. Clients,
as asset managers, commercial banks and foreign central banks buy and sell government se-
curities mostly through bilateral transactions to this group.3 Primary dealers are committed
to make, on demand, continuous and effective two-way prices to their clients by regulation.
They also must maintain a minimum market share (DMO, 2011).4
When a client trades in the UK gilt market, she can observe quotes of all dealers on
electronic trading platforms. However, these observed quotes are merely indicative and
only small trades can be executed at these prices. If the client wishes to trade a larger
quantity, she directly contacts the dealers typically via the phone. Unlike other, centralised
exchanges (e.g. the UK gilt futures market) that are increasingly automated, the gilt cash
market, which our study focuses on, continues to retain its traditional OTC characteristics
where reputation and trading relationships matter largely for dealers (to continue to attract
order flow and thereby trading profitably) as well as for clients (to receive favourable price
quotes.)
In our sample, we observe that clients tend to trade with a relatively small and persistent
subset of all the dealers. In practice, this subset corresponds closely to the subset they
requests quotes from. Based on interviews with traders, we understand that clients perceive
that asking quotes from many dealers can be costly.5 In particular, the main (perceived or
3In our sample, only about 1% of client trades are directly between clients.
4See Benos and Zikes (2018) for further details about the institutional arrangements of the UK gilt
market.
5Moreover, even the dealer whose quote is accepted by the client pays some informational cost, as all the
other dealers who have also been requested to provide quotes will know that the transaction took place. (In
fact, the runner-up in the auction gets informed specifically that her quote was the second best.) Especially
in the case of a large transaction, the dealers whose quotes were not accepted might use this price and
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real) cost of asking for quotes, but not trading with some of the dealers is that it might
damage the relationship between the client and the given dealers. For example, a dealer
might feel that she gives out information on her inventory when providing tight quotes.
This information might be used against the dealer. If this is not reciprocated with executed
trades, the dealer might decide to give less informative, that is, less tight quotes to that
particular client next time.
2.2 Client Connectivity and Private Information
The basic thought experiment behind our hypotheses is as follows. We conjecture that the
main advantage of trading with more dealers is that it helps the trader to hide its private
information.6 However, this requires the client to reach out for quotes from those dealers,
which might be costly. Then, the client will do so only when the advantage is large, that is,
when its information is sufficiently precise.
There are multiple testable implications of this idea. We derive these hypotheses for-
mally in Appendix B in a simple model of trading and network formation. We consider
informed clients and uninformed liquidity traders interacting with market makers. The
trading protocol is a modified version of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The new element is
that clients can decide whether to seek bid and ask quotes from one or more risk neutral,
competitive market makers in each round. Sampling quotes from more market makers is
costly. After observing the quotes, clients can decide whether to buy or sell a unit or abstain
from trading in each round. The informativeness of clients’ signals vary in the time-series
and in the cross-section. We assume that announcements correspond to periods with more
informative signals for many clients. The implications of the model are summarised in the
following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Under parametric assumptions, there is an equilibrium with the following fea-
tures.
1. (Connectedness signals information) A more connected speculator is more informed,
therefore, earns higher expected return on her trades, conditionally or unconditionally
on trading size and trading intensity.
2. (Anticipation effect) A more connected speculator’s buy trades predict higher future
value, and sell trades predict lower future value.
quantity information against the dealer (with the accepted quote) when she tries to manage the resulting
change in her inventory in the inter-dealer market.
6Since Kyle (1985), the micro structure literature has extensively studied how private information can be
concealed by, for example, splitting large orders in smaller amounts over time to avoid market impact (See
Garleanu and Pedersen (2013) and Mascio, Lines, and Naik (2017) for recent contributions). To conceal
information, market participants may use various mechanisms, as discussed in Duffie and Zhu (2017), such
as workups (Fleming and Nguyen, 2017) and dark pools (Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu, 2017; Buti, Rindi,
and Werner, 2017).
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3. (Announcements) The relation between connectedness and trading performance is stronger
around announcements.
The Corollary states that we should observe that when clients are connected to more
dealers, they overperform. Also, this overperformance should not come from smaller price
impact.7 Instead, the price of government bonds, purchased by clients in these periods,
should increase in subsequent days compared to the price of bonds they sell. Third, we
expect these differential effects to be more pronounced in more information-sensitive periods,
for example, around important macroeconomic announcements.
In Section 4, we test these hypotheses and find strong evidence for each of these pre-
dictions. In Section 5, we go further and search for the source of the private information
captured by the time-variation in clients’ connectedness. We provide detailed empirical
evidence that the nature of private information proxied by connectedness pertains to in-
formation about the order flow that is intermediated by those dealers that the given client
regularly trades with. Before turning to systematic evidence, we illustrate these ideas by
zooming in on the trading activity around the Brexit referendum.
2.3 Betting on Brexit: An Event Study
As a motivating example, we take a closer look at the connectedness-performance relation-
ship during the days around the Brexit referendum on leaving the European Union.
The referendum took place on Thursday 23 June 2016, and the results that 51.9% of
the participants voted to leave became public on Friday morning (24 June 2016). Based on
polls, the chances of a leave or a remain vote were close to 50-50 leaning slightly towards
remain immediately before the vote. Either way market prices were expected to jump. In
particular, the common perception was that a leave result would likely to trigger a rate cut
soon, leading to an immediate downward shift in the yield curve on 24 June. Figure 1a
shows that this is indeed what happened: the yield curve dropped immediately, while the
Bank of England cut the interest rate by 0.25% in August.
Given the large uncertainty before the vote, market participants were motivated to either
reduce their exposure radically, or to generate private information and bet on the outcome.
Reportedly, major hedge funds ordered private opinion polls to generate an informational
edge.8 Our main hypothesis implies that we should be able to separate these two groups
from each other based on the change of their connectivity before the vote. We should see
that clients with private information increase the number of dealers they trade with to
hide this information. Furthermore, they should be the group who, in average, increases
7In fact, in our model price impact, the difference between the execution price of a given client, and the
average execution price of other clients, can go up or down with connectedness depending on the parameters.
8See quote and reference from Bloomberg Businessweek in introduction.
7
the duration of its portfolio to speculate on the Leave outcome and when the yield curve
eventually jumps, they should overperform the others.
To verify this hypothesis, we group all those private clients who traded on the referendum
day 23 June into two groups based on the following client-specific measure:
αi = connectivityi,Jun23 − connectivityi (2.1)
where connectivityi,Jun23 is the number of dealers that client i traded with on the day of
the referendum; the term connectivityi is the average daily connectivity of client i based
on the whole sample (2011 Oct – 2017 Jun). The variable αi captures whether the given
client, on the referendum day, had unusually high or low connectivity compared to its own
long-run average. We identify 125 private clients who traded on the day of the referendum,
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the 125 Clients Trading on 23 June 2016
Client α Centrality Volume Net Duration Number
Type Mean Mean Mean Mean of Clients
Low-α -0.80 1.57 13,200,000 1,973,631 63
High-α 0.98 3.51 25,600,000 106,000,000 62
Client 5-day Performance 5-day Perf. Deviation Number
Type Mean Median Mean Median of Clients
Low-α -0.0040 -0.00013 -0.0040 -0.00017 63
High-α 0.0031 0.00025 0.0028 0.00065 62
Notes: this table provides descriptive statistics of the 125 identified private clients that traded on 23 June 2016. These
clients are placed in two groups depending on whether their α is below (top row) or above (bottom row) the median value
of α. Performance is measured in log points. The measure α and connectedness are measured in terms of number of dealer
connections. Volume and Net Duration are in £.
and Table 1 provides summary statistics of their performance and connectedness. High-α
clients traded with approximately one (0.98) additional dealer compared to their respective
average. In turn, low-α clients traded with approximately one (0.8) fewer dealer compared
to their respective average.
We find that high-α clients performed much better on the referendum day compared to
low-α clients. For example, the mean 5-day performance of the high-α clients was about
31bp which was more than 70bp higher than the mean performance of the low-α clients. This
is primarily due to the fact that high-α clients substantially increased their long position on
gilts before yields dropped sharply in the following days: the average high-α client’s change
in net duration was more than 50 times (106m) that of the low-α client (1.9m).
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Figure 1: Betting on Brexit: Centrality and Performance
(a) UK Yield Curve Before/After Referendum
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(b) Aggregate Daily Net Duration of High-α and Low-α Clients
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(c) Cumulative Returns of Low-α and High-α Clients.
Notes: In Panel 1a, the daily yield curve estimate is based on end-of-day closing prices. In Panel 2b, the red squared line
depicts the evolution of the duration-weighted net position of those 63 clients that have high within-connectedness (high α
2.1) on the day of the referendum. The blue circled line evolution of the duration-weighted net position of those 62 clients
that have low within-connectedness (low α 2.1) on the day of the referendum. In Panel 2c, the red squared line depicts the
cumulative average returns of those 63 clients that have high within-connectedness (high α 2.1) on the day of the referendum.
The blue circled line depicts cumulative average returns of those 62 clients that have low within-connectedness (low α 2.1) on
the day of the referendum. The average returns for both groups are weighted by the individual clients’ daily trading volume.
The returns are computed using the closing price on 29 June 2016 as the reference price.
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We now explore whether the trading behaviour of high-α clients was different from that
of the low-α clients, not only on the day of the referendum, but during the days leading
up to the vote. Figure 2b shows that clients with above the average dealer connections
on the day of the referendum (high-α clients) built up long positions not only on 23 June
but also during 21-22 June. They seem to close a large fraction of these positions after the
referendum. These trades benefited largely from the drop in yields (rise in prices) on 24
June and 27 June. In contrast, low-α clients were selling gilts during 21-22 June before
prices started increasing on 24 June.
A similar picture emerges when we compute performance measures for the two groups
of clients. For each transaction over the period 20 June – 28 June, we compute:
Performancej =
[
ln
(
P June29
)
− ln
(
P ?j
)]
× 1B,S, (2.2)
where P ?j is the transaction price, P June29 is the closing price of the corresponding gilt
on 29 June, and 1B,S is an indicator function equal to 1 when the transaction is a buy
trade, and −1 when it is a sell trade. All transactions-specific returns are then averaged
within the day using the pound volume of the trades as weights. We then compute average
returns for the low-α and high-α groups using the individual clients’ daily trading volume
as weights. Figure 2c then shows the cumulative returns for the two groups of clients. The
result confirms that the clients that experienced unusually high level of connectivity on the
day of the referendum were the ones to bet for a leave outcome, experiencing high trading
performance during the week of the referendum.
Now we turn to systematic evidence.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
Data Source To analyse how the dynamics of client-dealer connections are related to
clients’ trading performance and information, one needs a detailed transaction-level dataset
which contains information on the identity of both sides of a trade. The proprietary ZEN
database maintained by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), fittingly provides
this information together with information on the transaction date and time; the execution
price and quantity; the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN); the account
number, the buyer-seller flag. The ZEN database contains trade reports for all secondary-
market transactions, where at least one of the counterparties is an FCA-regulated entity.
We focus exclusively on conventional gilts. From now on we refer to primary dealers as
dealers. Given that all dealers in our sample are FCA-regulated, we have at least one report
for each dealer-client transaction, thereby giving us virtually full coverage of the client trade
universe. Our sample covers the period between October 2011 and June 2017. We match
our transaction-level data with information on bond duration and end-of-day closing prices
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obtained from Datastream.
Identifying Clients A key aspect of our empirical analysis is to exploit the time-variation
in client-dealer connections, which requires the matching of each transaction with a client
identifier. The names of clients are recorded as unstructured strings of text in the ZEN
database. Moreover, a typical client tends to have multiple accounts with different client
names across accounts and also within the same account. We use a textual algorithm
that searches the unstructured strings of names and accounts, and assigns a unique client
identifier to each transaction. When constructing client identifiers, we aim at the highest
possible level of consolidation by treating parent companies, subsidiaries and different arms
as one client. We end up with 474 identified clients and about 1.67 million trades transacted
by them. The trading activity of these clients covers around 80% of all client activity (in
terms of trading volume) in the UK gilt market.
Client-Dealer Connections Our baseline measure of client connectivity is the number
of dealers a given client is connected to in a given time period. A client is connected to a
dealer if it trades with the dealer at least once.9 Since client connectivity is a key variable
in our analysis, we provide some descriptive statistics to describe it.
Table 1 presents summary statistics based on our baseline regression sample that is
aggregated to the client-month level. We find that the average client in a given month
is connected to four dealers and carries out about 19 transactions with them. There is
substantial sample variation: the average difference in connections between the 90th and
10th percentile is 11. To illustrate how much of the variation in client connectivity is a
cross-sectional phenomenon, we compute the averages of our measures at the client-level,
and plot the resulting distribution in a histogram (Top Row of Figure 5). We find that the
distribution of the connectivity measure is positively skewed, with the mass of clients having
low values and a few clients exhibiting large values.
Clients that are on average more connected can differ from less connected clients along
other time-invariant characteristics such as size, business model etc. To control for this,
we purge out client fixed effects from our connectivity measures and plot the resulting
distribution in a histogram (Bottom Row of Figure 5). We find substantial within-client
variation: the average difference in connections between the 90th and 10th percentile is 4.5,
which is non-negligible compared to the corresponding value using across-client variation
(7.5). Similarly, the standard deviation of first-order connections is around 3.3 in the cross-
section and still as high as 1.9 when using only the within-client variation. This substantial
9To check for the robustness of our results, we also use eigenvector centrality (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001)
as an alternative measure of connectivity. This measure, used in recent papers (Maggio, Kermani, and Song,
2017), not only takes into account the number of dealers a given client trades with but also the number of
other clients that are connected to those dealers that the given client trades with.
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within-variation in connectedness is an important feature of the data, which our empirical
analysis will primarily rely on.
4 Proxying Client’s Private Information
4.1 Measuring Trading Performance
Baseline Measure To measure trading performance, we follow Maggio, Franzoni, Ker-
mani, and Sommavilla (2018) and compute the T -day-horizon return on each trade of client
i in month t, measured as the percentage difference between the transaction price and the
closing price T days after the transaction date.10 Formally, for each trade j, we construct
the measure PerformanceTi,t as follows:
PerformanceTj =
[
ln
(
P T
)
− ln
(
P ?j
)]
× 1B,S, (4.1)
where P ?j is the transaction price, P T is the T -day ahead closing price of the corresponding
gilt, and 1B,S is an indicator function equal to 1 when the transaction is a buy trade, and
−1 when it is a sell trade. All transactions-specific returns are then averaged within month
t using the pound value of the trades as weights. As robustness, we also present the results
using unweighted monthly average returns.
Table 1 summary statistics of the 3-day and 5-day (weighted and unweighted) perfor-
mance measures. Panel C shows that average performance is significantly larger for clients
with more dealer connections compared to clients with fewer connections. More importantly,
as shown in Panel D, we also find that the average client performs significantly better in
months with more dealer connections compared to months when the same client has fewer
connections. For example, the average client has a 1.5bp higher 5-day performance in high-
connectedness months compared to low-connectedness months.
Decomposing Trading Performance We now propose a decomposition method which
extends our baseline performance measurement. The T -day performance of a client on a
trade can be high because the given client faces lower price impact compared to other clients
trading at the same time. We refer to this as the transaction component of performance.
Alternatively, trading performance can be high because the given client can better anticipate
future prices changes. We refer to this as the anticipation component of performance.
10The T -day horizon starts at the start of each day and ends after T days. We use overlapping time
windows. For example, to compute one-day performance measures (T = 1), we compare all trades on day
1 to the closing price on day 2, and compare all trades on day 2 to the close price on day 3, and so on.
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Building on 4.1, we compute the decomposition for each transaction j as follows:
ln
(
P T
)
− ln
(
P ?j
)
≈
[
ln
(
P T
)
− ln
(
P
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Anticipation
+
[
ln
(
P
)
− ln
(
P ?j
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸,
Transaction
(4.2)
where P is the only new term which denotes the average transaction price (based on all
available dealer-client trades in the corresponding gilt) measured around the time of trans-
action j. To estimate P , we experiment with two time definitions. First, we use all relevant
trades on the day of transaction j to compute the average transaction price P . As a sec-
ond, more accurate measure, we split each trading day into three parts, and compare the
transaction price to the corresponding one of the three intra-day averages.11 Given the
trade-level decomposition, we then collapse our dataset at the client-month level using both
volume-weighted and unweighted monthly average returns.
Note that most of the recent empirical work on financial networks (Afonso, Kovner,
and Schoar, 2014; Hendershott, Li, Livdan, and Norman, 2017; Hollifield, Neklyudov, and
Spatt, 2017; Maggio, Kermani, and Song, 2017) focused on the transaction component.
Distinguishing between the transaction component and the anticipation component allows
us to test whether higher connectedness increases performance because clients can achieve
more favourable deals (at lower mark-ups) or because clients have private information about
future price changes.
Predicting Changing Yield Curve vs Noise We also explore whether a client’s T -day
performance on a trade can be high because the client can better predict changes in the
shape of the yield curve, or because the client can better predict changes in the distance of
individual gilt yields (pricing error) from an otherwise unchanged yield curve. We compute
the decomposition for each transaction j as follows:
ln
(
P T
)
− ln
(
P ?j
)
≈
[
ln
(
MT
)
− ln
(
M0
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Curve−Shift
+
{[
ln
(
P T
)
− ln
(
MT
)]
+
[
ln
(
M0
)
− ln
(
P ?j
)]}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pricing−Error
(4.3)
where M0 and MT are the end of 0-day and 5-day prices implied by standard yield curve
models (Nelson and Siegel, 1987; Svensson, 1994).
An Alternative Performance Measure Our performance measure compares the trans-
action price with the future market price of the security. Whether a client liquidates her
position at that future price, or holds on to it, does not influence our measure. That is, our
performance measure might not correspond to realised profits. This is in contrast to the bulk
of previous empirical work on over-the-counter markets which measures performance as the
11The intra-day time windows are <11am, 11am-15pm and >15pm, which are set to have an approximately
even number of transactions across the time windows.
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return on dealers’ round-trip transactions. The reason why we do not follow that approach
is that our focus is not on the performance of dealers – who trade very frequently and tend
to finish their day with small net positions – but on clients. In our sample, clients trade
for heterogeneous reasons. In aggregate, they tend to persistently accumulate positions as
they ultimately purchase most of the issued securities by the DMO. Individually, some trade
frequently, some buy and hold. Some might aim for profit by turning over their portfolio
quickly, others might aim instead to acquire their desired positions at a favourable price.
Our performance measure is neutral to the objective of the client. If the client manages to
buy at a low price or sell at a high price compared to the price in the subsequent period,
we measure that as a high value transaction.
Still, as a robustness test, we construct a second performance measure which measures
realised profit in a given month directly, building on the average-cost-approach of inventory
valuation. In particular, for each client i, gilt a, month m, we compute:
Ri,a,m =
ln
∑J
S
i,a,m
jS=1 Pi,a,jSQi,a,jS∑JSi,a,m
jS=1 Qi,a,jS
− ln
∑J
B
i,a,m
jB=1 Pi,a,jBQi,a,jB∑JBi,a,m
jB=1 Qi,a,jB

×min
J
S
i,a,m∑
jS=1
Qi,a,jS ,
JBi,a,m∑
jB=1
Qi,a,jB
 ,
(4.4)
where Jpi,a,m, with p = S,B, denote the total number of monthly, gilt-specific sale and buy
transactions, respectively, while Pi,a,jp and Qi,a,jp corresponds to the price and quantity of
transaction jp. We then compute the weighted average of Ri,a,m across gilts (using the
client’s monthly trading volume in gilt a as weights) to obtain a realized profit measure at
the client-month level.
4.2 Client Connectivity and Trading Performance
Given the trading performance measures (4.1 and 4.2) we now explore empirically whether a
client’s trading performance increases when the given client increases its connections with the
primary dealer sector. In this Subsection, our results are based on data at monthly frequency.
This is to reduce measurement noise and also to avoid oversampling those clients who trade
actively, possibly on most trading days. Nevertheless, as will be shown in Subsection 4.4,
our results are robust to using data at daily frequency.
Baseline Results Our baseline specification is the following monthly panel regression:
PerformanceTi,t = β × ClientConnectionsi,t +Xi,t + αi + µt + εi,t, (4.5)
where PerformanceTi,t is the trading performance of client i in month t at horizon T ;
ClientConnectionsi,t is the number of primary dealers the given client is connected to in
month t; Xi,t includes controls such as the number of transactions and trading volume; αi
and µt are client and time fixed effects. Throughout the analysis, in computing standard
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errors we take the most conservative approach, and employ two-way clustering at the client
and time level. This procedure allows for arbitrary correlation across time and across clients.
The main coefficient of interest in 4.5 is β which captures the relation between client
connectivity and trading performance. Table 2 reports our baseline results with panel A and
panel B showing the results for value-weighted and unweighted trading performance, respec-
tively. Each column corresponds to a different trading horizon going from T = 0 to T = 5.
We find a positive relationship between client connectivity and trading performance, which
is statistically significant at almost every horizon for both types of performance measures.
This complements the evidence of Maggio, Franzoni, Kermani, and Sommavilla (2018) on
the role of broker centrality in affecting the trading performance of stock market participants
in the US.12 Moreover, we find little evidence that variation in a client’s trading volume or
number of transactions would affect the given client’s trading performance.13
The results are also economically significant. For example, using the estimate (0.489bp)
in Column 6 of Table 2, we find that if a client increases the number of its dealer connections
by one, then its trading performance doubles relative to its mean (we are using the fact that
the median and mean 5-day returns are 0.45bp and 0.43bp, respectively). Table 3 further
illustrates the economic significance of the performance-connectedness relationship. Panel
3a compares months when clients have low connectedness to months when they have high
connectedness. Single-sorting using the within-variation in connectedness, we find that the
difference in median performances is about 0.5bp, consistent with our baseline regression
results (Table 2). Moreover, clients trade much more when they are more connected: the
median trading volume is about £15million (£53million) in months when the client has fewer
(more) dealer connections than its sample average. The performance difference coupled
with the difference in trading volume in high and low connectivity months implies that the
majority of positive trading performance is concentrated in high connectivity months.
To reinforce that our results are not simply picking up the effect of trading volume
(driving both connections and performance), in panel 3b, we extend this analysis and double-
sort our sample using the within-variation both in connectedness and in trading volume.
The performance difference in high and low connectivity months is approximately the same
irrespective of whether the client’s trading volume is high or low, and thereby the majority
of positive trading performance continues to coincide with high connectivity months.
12In terms of research design, the difference between our analysis and theirs is that we essentially compare
the trades of a connected client to the trades of the same client when she was more/less connected. Maggio,
Franzoni, Kermani, and Sommavilla (2018) compares the trades of a client that are channeled through more
connected brokers to the trades of the same client that are channeled through less connected brokers.
13Figure 20 in the Appendix shows the results from a pooled regression with client fixed effects excluded.
While client connectedness continues to have a significantly positive relationship with trading performance,
the coefficients on trading volume and transaction number also appear statistically significant in the cross-
section. This may be explained by the fact that our clients include a range of investor types (e.g. insurance
companies, hedge funds, pension funds). Also, the cross-sectional distribution of size and transaction number
may be correlated with other characteristics, as studied extensively by the mutual fund literature (Elton,
1993; Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers, 2000; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005).
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Moreover, we assess the persistence of the effect of client connectivity and gradually
increase the trading horizon up to 30 days (T = 30) while re-estimating our baseline regres-
sion 4.5. In Figure 2, we present the 30 estimated βs, using the value weighted performance
measure, together with the 90% confidence bands. We find that the effect peaks at the
5-day horizon, but we still find that client connectivity significantly affects performance at
the 10-day horizon. The effect then gradually decays, with the point estimate reaching zero
at the 17-day horizon. According to our model, the intuition is as follows. The client might
Figure 2: Baseline Performance Regressions over 0-30 day Horizons
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Client Connectivity Effects at Longer Horizons
Notes: this figure plots the estimated β coefficients from our baseline regression 4.5 up to 30-day horizon (T = 30), using the
value weighted performance variable as the regressand, measured in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm
of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions
(“Transactions”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client observations that are based
on at least 2 transactions in the month. The shaded area denotes the 90% confidence band, It is based on robust standard
errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level.
trade because of liquidity reasons or on private information. Only in the latter case she is
motivated to request for more quotes and, consequently, to trade with more dealers. This is
so, because there is no need to hide the exact composition of its trades if its for liquidity rea-
sons. This is why we find that trades in months when the client is more connected are more
profitable. Time-variation in connectedness is a proxy for the level of private information
behind the client’s trade.
Note that our theory does not imply causality between connectedness and performance
in any direction. Instead, both higher performance and higher connectedness are caused by
more private information.
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Decomposing Trading Performance into Transaction and Anticipation Compo-
nents Given our baseline results, we now explore the channels through which client con-
nectivity is related to trading performance. Specifically, we test whether more connected
clients may perform better because they get better deals compared to other clients trading
around the same time (transaction component) or because they can better anticipate future
price changes over the coming trading days (anticipation component). To this end, we esti-
mate two modified versions of our baseline specification (4.5) with the trading performance
measure replaced with the anticipation and transaction components (4.2). Table 4 shows
the decomposition results for the 5-day value-weighted performance measure.
Our results show that the dealer, when more connected, tends to perform significantly
better in each component. When more connected, she tends to trade at a more favourable
price and to the direction of future price movements. Quantitatively, we find that the
anticipation component has much higher role in the overall higher performance of clients
when they are more connected. In particular, less than 20% of our baseline effect is explained
by the transaction component, with the anticipation component being responsible for the
majority of our baseline effect.
Forecasting the Yield-Curve and Noise Figure 6 and 7 show the decomposition of
Figure 3 into the component of yield curve forecasts and noise forecasts as specified by
(4.3). Looking at the two figures together, there is some evidence that the yield curve
component is stronger than the pricing-error component. Note, that if pricing-errors are
not persistent beyond a day, than the transitional component in (4.2) is expected to be
close to the pricing-error component in (4.3).
Centrality and Realized Profit As a robustness check we run our baseline specification
with our within-month realized profit measure on the right hand side. As the first panel
of Table 5 shows, while higher connectedness of a given client is associated with higher
realized profit, this relationship is not significant in the full sample. However, if we focus on
those client-month observations when the given client trades frequently (i.e. more than the
median number of transactions), the relationship is significant. Our interpretation is that
our within-month realized profit measure captures high value trades only for those clients
and for those periods when the client trades a lot within a month.
So far, our empirical results provide support for the first three predictions of our theo-
retical framework, summarised in Proposition (1). We now turn to the fourth prediction of
the model, namely, that the relationship between connectivity and trading performance is
stronger when price volatility is higher.
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4.3 Macroeconomic Announcements
Since Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999); Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), there has been
ample empirical evidence on the effect of scheduled macroeconomic announcements on gov-
ernment bond prices and volatility. Green (2004) finds that the informational role of trading
increases following announcements, indicating that the release of public information raises
the level of information asymmetry in the government bond market. His evidence suggests
that some market participants have an advantage at processing the newly arrived informa-
tion. Building on this literature, we now explore whether the effect of client connectivity on
trading performance is different following the arrival of public information.
Our baseline analysis relies on UK monetary policy announcements and the release of
the consumer price index. Policy announcements include the publication of the quarterly
inflation report, the policy interest rate decision of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
and the release of the minutes (Table 17).14 Out of the 1470 trading days in our sample,
we end up with 196 trading days that coincide with news about the policy interest rate and
inflation. In the spirit of our analysis above, we compute two sets of monthly performance
measures for each of our client: one that is based on all announcement days, and another
based on all other trading days without announcements. Accordingly, we extend our baseline
regression 4.5. and estimate the following model:
PerformanceTi,t,p = ρ×DAnni,p × ClientConnectionsi,t
+ β × ClientConnectionsi,t +Xi,t + αi + µt + εi,t,p
(4.6)
where DAnni,p is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the performance measure is based on
trading days with macroeconomic announcements and 0 otherwise. The term ρ is the coeffi-
cient of interest which measures whether connectedness has differential effect on performance
during announcements, compared to non-announcement days. Table 18 and 19 show that
the effect of client connections on trading performance is substantially stronger on trading
days of scheduled inflation or interest rate announcements. For example, the point estimate
0.00308 in Table 18 suggests that the effect of trading with an additional dealer on the 3-
day performance is twice as strong on an announcement day than on a trading day without
announcements, with the difference being highly statistically significant. To assess the per-
sistence of the effect, we gradually increase the trading horizon up to 30 days (T = 30), and
re-estimate our regression model 4.6. The black line in Figure 3 represents the 30 estimated
βs associated with non-announcement days, using the value weighted performance measure,
together with the 90% confidence bands. The blue line shows the effect of connectedness
on announcement days. We find that, at all trading horizons, the relationship between con-
nectedness and trading performance is stronger during macroeconomic announcements than
14See Gerko and Rey (2017) for further details on the institutional arrangements of the UK and US
monetary policy decision making process.
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Figure 3: Performance Regressions over 0-30 day Horizons: Trading Days With and Without
Release of Macroeconomic News
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Notes: the black line plots the estimated β coefficients from the regression 4.6 up to 30-day horizon (T = 30), using the value
weighted performance variable (based on non-announcement days) as the regressand, measured in basis points. The blue line
plots the sum of the estimated coefficients ρ + β, representing the effect on announcement days. We include as a control the
natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the natural logarithm of the number of monthly
transactions (“Transactions”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client observations
that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. The shaded area denotes the 90% confidence band associated with the
estimated β coefficients, It is based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level.
on non-announcement days. This is consistent with the prediction of our model in Section
2.
As a further robustness check, we include additional announcement days in our analysis
such as the release of UK real activity indicators (unemployment, average earnings, manu-
facturing production and GDP) as these indicators have been found to strongly affect the
government bond markets in the US (Fleming and Remolona 1997, 1999). We also add the
days of the release of US FOMC statements and minutes, as recent evidence showed strong
effects of US monetary policy shocks affecting global financial markets (Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey (2015); Gerko and Rey (2017)). This leaves us with 422 trading days that coincide
with macroeconomic announcements. Tables 23–24 show that the results are similar to our
baseline.
4.4 Results from Daily Data
Our results so far were based on data at monthly frequency. This was to reduce measurement
noise and also to avoid oversampling those clients who trade actively, possibly on most
trading days. However, one concern might be that monthly averaging introduces problems
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of time aggregation which makes it difficult to accurately measure the dynamics of client-
dealer connections. To address this, we re-estimate most of our regressions on daily data.
Interestingly, the time-series variation in client connections continues to be substantial when
we go to daily frequency. Table 6 shows that the standard deviation of connectedness is
about 1.5 when using only the within-variation, i.e. the average client frequently changes
the number of dealers that she trades across trading days.
Results for our performance regressions, presented in Table 7, are similar to our monthly
regression results – though seem less persistent with the connectivity effect peaking at the
four-day horizon. In Figure 8, we plot the estimated connectedness coefficients for longer
horizons (8a) along with the interaction effects of monetary policy announcements (8b),
corroborating the increased strength of the performance-connectedness relationship during
the arrival of public information.
5 The Nature of Private Information
Our finding that a client tends to perform better when trading with more dealers suggests
that time-variation in connectedness is a proxy for the level of client’s private information.
In this section, we use this proxy to explore the nature of private information in this market.
This is an intriguing topic as the market for government bonds is often viewed as a market
with little role for private information.
Our starting point is the ample empirical evidence in the literature (Evans and Lyons
2002; Brandt and Kavajecz 2004; Menkveld, Sarkar, and van der Wel 2012) that aggregate
order flow dynamics explain prices in various dealer driven markets including government
bond and currency markets. This literature observed that agents who have information
about the future order flow in these markets can use this information profitably.
Motivated by this, we proceed in five steps. First, as presented in Subsection 5.1, we
define measures of the co-movement of the composition of client’s orders and the future
aggregate order flow of a given group of clients. The idea is that whenever this measure
is positive, the client, intentionally or by chance, is effectively front-running that group
of clients. Second, as presented in Subsection 5.2, we test whether any of these measures
identify profitable trades. We find that whenever the duration composition of a client’s trade
is similar to that of all the other clients in subsequent days, her performance is higher. Third,
as presented in Subsection 5.3, we connect our baseline results to order flow information. In
particular, we show that whenever a client is more connected, the composition of her trades
tend to be more similar to the group of clients in subsequent days who are served by the
same dealer. We also show that a client who is a regular counterparty of the given dealer
can predict the composition of the order flow better. This suggests that dealers have an
important role in disseminating order flow information towards their own, regular clients.
Fourth, as presented in Subsection 5.4, we also show that all our findings are stronger
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for the group of clients who drove our baseline performance result. Finally, as presented
in Subsection 5.5, we use our data at daily frequency which allows us to measure more
accurately the timing of the formation of client-dealer connections, and thereby to assess
whether connectedness might be part of the information acquisition process.
5.1 Measuring Co-movement between Client Trades and Future
Order Flow
There are multiple ways to measure whether a client trades in the same direction other
clients in the subsequent days. For each suggested measure, we start with the net trading
position of client i, on day d, in asset a, Wi,d,a. We also compute the aggregated cumulative
net trading position of group g between days d+ 1 and d+T in asset a, denoted by W gd+T,a.
The identity of group g will play an important role in section 5.3 where we identify the
group of which order flow connected clients can forecast. For now, we set g for the group of
all the clients in the market.
Then, our first daily covariance measure, Y C(1)T,gi,d , is computed as follows:
Y C(1)T,gi,d =
1
A
A∑
a=1
(
Wi,d,a − 1
A
A∑
a=1
Wi,d,a
)(
W gd+T,a −
1
A
A∑
a=1
W gd+T,a
)
. (5.1)
where A is the total number of assets traded on the given day. This measure is high, if on a
given day the given trader happens to buy (sell) more of the assets which, n the subsequent
T days, group g also buys (sells) more of.
For our other covariance measures, we partition all transactions in K segments of equal
size based on the modified duration of the traded gilts in that transaction. Then, we
aggregate Wi,d,a and W gd+T,a across each segment, k, and denote them as Wi,d,k and W
g
d+T,k
respectively. With the help of these objects we define two further measures as follows:
Y C(2)T,gi,d =
1
K
K∑
k=1
(
Wi,d,k − 1
K
K∑
k=1
Wi,d,k
)(
W gd+T,k −
1
K
K∑
k=1
W gd+T,k
)
. (5.2)
Y C(3)T,gi,d =
1
A
A∑
a=1
(Wi,d,a −Wi,d,k)
(
W gd+T,a −W gd+T,k
)
(5.3)
Measure Y C(3)T,gi,d is high, if the given client tends to concentrate its orders on the same
securities within a given segment as group g in the subsequent T days. In contrast, Y C(2)T,gi,d
is high, if the given client tends to concentrate its orders in the same segment as group g
in the subsequent T days, regardless whether the actual securities in the given segment are
the same. As
Wi,d,a − 1
A
A∑
a=1
Wi,d,a = [Wi,d,a −Wi,d,k] + [Wi,d,k − 1
k
k∑
k=1
Wi,d,k] (5.4)
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and
W gd+T,a −
1
A
A∑
a=1
W gd+T,a = [W gd+T,a −W gd+T,k] + [W gd+T,k −
1
k
k∑
k=1
W gd+T,k] (5.5)
Y C(2)T,gi,d and Y C(3)
T,g
i,d are components of Y C(1)
T,g
i,d .
This decomposition is interesting because we expect the prices of gilts with similar dura-
tions to react similarly to the aggregate order flow. Hence, it might be similarly profitable
for a client to guess right the segments where future demand pressure will be concentrated,
as opposed to guessing right the particular security. In that case, Y C(2)T,gi,d might be high,
even if Y C(2)T,gi,d is low. In the next part, we test which of these measures corresponds to
high profitability trades.
5.2 Which Type of Private Information is Profitable?
In this section, we test whether any of our covariance measures Y C(1), Y C(2), Y C(3) iden-
tify profitable trading days. We proceed as follows. Using the given measure Y C(·), in each
month we partition the trading days in two sets, p ∈ {Low,High}. A day is in the high
(low) set, if Y C(·) for the given day is larger (smaller) than its median in the full sample.
Then, we estimate the following regression:
PerformanceTi,t,p = γ ×Qi,p + δi,t + εi,t,p, (5.6)
where PerformanceTi,t,p is the version of our baseline performance measure (4.1) which is
aggregated only over set p of trading days in months t for client i. Qi,p is a dummy taking
value 1 if the performance measure of client i is based on high-covariance trading days and 0
if it is based on low-covariance days. The term δi,t is a client-month fixed effect. Tables 8 and
9 show the results for each covariance measure Y C(1), Y C(2), Y C(3) when the covariance
measure uses the cumulative aggregate client order flow at the 3-day horizon (columns 1-3)
or 5-day horizon (columns 4-6). For both cases, we compute the turnover-weighted (Table
8) and unweighted (Table 9) performance measures at the 1-, 3- and 5-day horizons. The
results show that covariance measure Y C(2) shown in panel (b) is our best choice to identify
trades which are profitable because the composition of a client’s portfolio is similar to that
of the market in the subsequent days. This suggests that a client has strong incentives to
guess whether future orders will be concentrated in the short or the long segment of the yield
curve or in between. The effect is economically significant as trading performance can be
2-4bp higher on high covariance days. At the same time, as panel (c) illustrates, forecasting
the exact security within the segment where the order flow would be concentrated does not
seem to be profitable.
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5.3 Connected Clients Predict the Order Flow
Let us return to our baseline result that the time-variation in a client’s number of connections
is a proxy for her level of private information. In this section, we collect evidence that this
private information is on the duration composition of the future order flow of certain group
of other clients, as measured by our covariance measure Y C(2)T,gi,d . In this case, we expect
that the covariance measure of a given client in a given month tends to be higher when
this client is more connected. Hence, we compute monthly averages of Y C(2)T,gi,d , denoted
as Y CT,gi,t to estimate the following panel regression:
Y CT,gi,t = φ× ClientConnectionsi,t +Xi,t + αi + µt + εi,t, (5.7)
where the terms on the right-hand-side are identical to our baseline specification 4.5.
Panel A of Table 10 shows the results with respect to the total order flow (g = Total).
While we see a positive relationship between the time-variation in connectedness and the
duration decomposition of client’s current trades at that of the aggregate order flow, this
relationship is not strong.
Instead, in Panel B and C, we decompose aggregate order flow as follows. We isolate
the part of the aggregate order flow that is intermediated through the dealers which a given
client is connected to (g = Own) from the part that goes through all the other dealers that
the given client is not connected to (g = Non−Own).
We further decompose the Own measure based on whether the given client has a more
regular relationship with a dealer (g = Regular), distinguishing it from other client-dealer
connections that are relatively new (g = New). We regard a client-dealer connection regular
if the client traded with the given dealer in the current as well as in the previous month;
whereas we regard a connection new if a client traded with the dealer in the current month
but not in the previous month.
Note that, by the additivity of covariance, our measure is additive in the following sense:
Y CT,Totali,t = Y C
T,Own
i,t + Y C
T,Non−Own
i,t = Y C
T,Regular
i,t + Y C
T,New
i,t + Y C
T,Non−Own
i,t . (5.8)
This property helps the interpretation of our results.
Perhaps the most intriguing finding of this part is in Panel B of Table 10. It decomposes
the aggregate private client flow into the part that is intermediated by those dealers that the
given client is connected to (Columns 1-3) in contrast with the order flow that is channelled
through dealers that the client is not connected to (Columns 4-6). We find that it is the
covariance with Own dealer order flow that correlates with the client’s connectivity, and
the effects for Non−Own dealer order flow are economically and statistically insignificant.
Our interpretation is that primary dealers, intentionally or unintentionally, disseminate
information about the future orders towards (some of) their clients. We have little evidence
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on the exact mechanism. In principle, dealers’ private information on their clients expected
orders in the subsequent days might be revealed accidentally by the dealers’ quotes. Or
it might be that there is an intentional information flow from dealers to their best clients
helping dealers to keep these clients. Indeed, Panel C shows that higher client connectivity
predicts more the order flow intermediated by Regular dealers and predict less the order flow
that goes through newly connected dealers. This is also consistent with Maggio, Kermani,
and Song (2017) that finds evidence on the role of the trading relationship strength in
affecting trading performance in the US stock market.
We provide further evidence on the importance of dealers in forecasting future flows, by
using our dataset at a more disaggregated level. First, for each client i, we compute the daily
net trading position in each duration bucket k (5.2). Second, we compute the future net
trading position (cumulated over the subsequent T days) aggregated across all clients that
trade with those dealers who are connected with client i in the given month. We refer to this
as the future flow of Own dealers. We also compute the aggregate future client flow that is
intermediated by those dealers who are not connected with client i in the given month. We
refer to this as the future flow of Non-own dealers. Consistent with the evidence in Table
10, we expect to find that the relationship between client order flow and future flow of Own
dealers should be higher in those months when the client has higher level of connectivity. In
turn, we do not expect the relationship between client order flow and future flow Non-own
dealers to be different in high and low connectivity months. Figure 4 shows the estimated
regressions slopes from four separate linear regressions. The top (bottom) row shows the
relationship between client flow and future flow of Own (Non-own) dealers. The right (left)
column shows the relationship between the flows when the client is more (less) connected
compared to its own average. We find that client flows co-move more strongly with Own
dealer flows than with Non-own dealer flows, reflected by the statistically insignificant slope
coefficients in the bottom row of Figure 4. Importantly, we find the strongest co-movement
between client flows and future Own dealer flows when clients are more connected. This
is shown by the regression coefficient in the top right panel (0.59) being almost four times
larger than the slope in the top left panel (0.16).
Overall, the results of this and the previous subsections suggest that the nature of private
information, proxied by client connectivity, is related to the order flow intermediated by the
given client’s dealers.
5.4 Variation in Clients’ Performance Sensitivity
It is important to keep in mind that our baseline result in Table 2 masks significant hetero-
geneity across clients. For some of our clients there is a very strong co-movement between
connectedness and performance while for others there is no co movement at all. Our in-
terpretation is that not all clients are in the market to profit from short-term bets based
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Figure 4: Contemporaneous Client Order Flow and Future Aggregate Order Flow: the Roles
of Centrality and client-dealer connections
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Notes: Each panel shows the estimated regression slope (with associated 90% confidence interval) that corresponds to the
relationship between contemporaneous order flow of an individual client i and the aggregate cumulative future order flow of
all clients. The units of observation are daily and duration-specific net trading positions of a given client i that are regressed
against daily and duration-specific aggregate cumulative future net trading positions of all clients that are intermediated by
all the dealers that client i is connected to (top row) and by all other dealers that client i is not connected to (bottom row).
The left (right) column looks at the flow relationships in those months when client i is in the bottom (top) quartile of client
connectedness (using within variation). The axes are measured in £1,000,000s.
on private information. In this section, we explore variation in the sensitivity of client’s
trading performance to connectedness to provide additional evidence to our narrative. In
particular, we enforce the insights that (1) time-variation in connectedness is a proxy for
private information on the duration composition of future order flows, (2) this information
is disseminated by dealers to their own clients only, (3) regular clients tend to be more the
recipients of this information.
We proceed in two steps. First, we re-estimate our baseline regression (4.1) for each
client separately, and then sort the clients based on the their estimated β coefficients. We
define a dummy variable, DHβi , which takes value 1 if the client’s estimated β is above the
median (’high-β clients’) and takes value 0 otherwise (’low-β clients’). Second, we extend
the empirical model 5.7, by adding the interaction term DHβi × ClientConnectionsi,t to it,
and estimate the following panel-regression:
Y CT,gi,t = ρ×DHβi × ClientConnectionsi,t
+ β × ClientConnectionsi,t +Xi,t + αi + µt + εi,t,p
(5.9)
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where ρ is the coefficient of interest which measures whether the effect of connectedness
on the covariance measure is higher amongst those clients whose trading performance is
more sensitive to connectedness (DHβi ). Tables 11–13 confirms that the effect between
connectedness and the ability to predict the order flow is significantly stronger amongst
high-β clients compared to low-β clients. This is true for the aggregate order flow just as
well, as for our decompositions. This group can forecast better the order flow of their own
clients and the effect is stronger for clients who are regular than for those who are new
comers to the particular dealer.
5.5 Daily Variation in Connections
We now turn to our daily data which allows us to measure more accurately the timing of the
formation of client-dealer connection. First, we test at daily frequency whether information
about the duration composition of future market order flow increases performance. To show
this, we estimate the following regression:
PerformanceTi,t = γ ×QGi,t +Xi,t + αi + µt + εi,t, (5.10)
where QGi,p (with G = Total) is a dummy taking value 1 if the performance measure of
client i is based on high-covariance trading days and 0 if it is based on low-covariance days
(Formula 5.2), with respect to the total market order flow. Table 14 shows that when the
duration composition of the client’s order flow has high covariance with that of the market
one day (Table 15a) or three days (Table 15b) after the client traded, then the client’s
short-run performance increases by 2-3bp.
We argued that clients are less likely to predict the total market order flow than the order
flow intermediated by the client’s own dealers. We use our daily data to test whether such
partial but more accessible information about the order flow still significantly profitable, by
changing out dummy variable to G = Own. Table 15 shows that the estimated coefficients
for QGi,p are roughly halved compared to Table 14, suggesting that predicting the order flow
intermediated by the client’s own dealers is, on average, about half as valuable for making
profits than predicting the order flow of the whole market.
We now connect our results about client performance (Table 7) and about order flow
predictions (14–15), and estimate whether clients can better predict their own dealer’s order
flow on trading days with unusually high connectedness. Unlike in our monthly specifica-
tion, note that we define the client’s own dealers with reference to the given trading day:
own dealers are the ones that the client traded with on the day of the trade as well as during
the past 10 trading days. The more accurate measurement of the timing of client-dealer
connections allows us to better separate the time-variation in connectedness from the forma-
tion of client-dealer relationships, thereby assessing whether client connectedness is part of
the information acquisition process or it is merely an instrument of concealing information.
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To assess this, we turn to our covariance-connectedness regressions (5.7). Specifically,
we estimate whether client connectedness predicts the covariance of the client’s order flow
with the whole market. As shown by Panel a of Table 16, we find only weak evidence for
this, consistent with our monthly results. Moreover, as presented in Panel b of Table 16, we
estimate whether higher connections predict higher covariance with the order flow of those
dealers that the client traded with on the given trading day as well as during the preceding
10 trading days (columns 1-3). This is contrasted with the results when the covariance
between the client’s order flow and its dealer’s is based on those dealers that the client only
traded with on the given trading day, but not during the preceding 10 trading days (columns
4-6). The fact that more connected clients cannot predict the order flow of newly connected
dealers (only that of the regular dealers) suggests that connectedness is not instrumental in
the information acquisition process, but it merely helps transform information into better
performance.
6 Summary and Conclusion
To conclude, our paper presents three main empirical findings. First, it shows that clients
trading in the UK government bond market generate significantly higher abnormal returns
in time periods when they have more dealer connections compared to months when they
have fewer connections. To the extent that systematically higher trading performance is
driven by private information, our results imply that client connectedness can be used as a
proxy for private information. Second, we show that the nature of private information, that
clients with more connections have, pertains to the aggregate order flow intermediated by
the primary dealers that the clients trade with. Third, the predictable part of the order flow
is intermediated by the client’s regular dealers, suggesting that the acquisition of information
precedes the increase in connectedness.
These results have several implications. First, our results highlight the relevance of
financial network formation to the price discovery process in government bond markets.
While the literature has extensively studied the role of private information and aggregate
order flow in determining yield curve dynamics, we find that a better understanding of the
network structure can sharpen our understanding of the price discovery process in these
markets. Second, while a number of recent papers have studied the core-periphery structure
of OTC markets (primarily focusing on the cross-sectional characteristics of dealer-client re-
lationships), our results emphasize the dynamic and endogenous nature of networks. Third,
slow trade execution is often regarded as optimal because it minimizes price impact, thereby
helping to hide private information (Kyle, 1985). We find that trade execution with multi-
ple primary dealers could serve a similar purpose, suggesting that splitting trades over time
and across dealers may be substitutable. Investigating these issues both theoretically and
empirically would provide interesting avenues for future research.
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7 Figures and Tables
7.1 Summary Statistics
Figure 5: Time-series and Cross-sectional Variation in Centrality
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Notes: these figures summarize the time-series and cross-sectional variation in our first-order (left column) and eigenvalue-
centrality (right column) measures. The top row plots the distribution of mean client connectedness. To construct the bottom
row, we first run a panel regression to purge out client and month fixed effects (Connectionsi,t = αi + µt + εi,t), and plot the
distribution of the residuals (εi,t).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – Month-Client Level
(a) All Clients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Median p10 p90 sd N
First Order Connection 5.434 4 1 12 4.086 21,170
Eigenvalue-centrality 0.0275 0.0230 0.00483 0.0588 0.0206 21,170
Transaction Number 86.70 19 4 184 274.8 21,170
log(V olume) 17.29 17.50 13.40 20.82 2.821 21,170
Average Monthly Duration 8.621 8.288 3.379 14.03 4.232 21,170
(b) Well Connected vs Less Connected Clients [Across-Client Variation]
Below Median Centrality Above Median Centrality
Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
First Order Connection 2.478 2 1.251 8.951 8 3.454
Eigenvalue-centrality 0.0124 0.0121 0.00762 0.0455 0.0413 0.0163
Transaction Number 26.03 9 71.25 158.9 50 386.9
log(V olume) 16.12 16.30 2.610 18.67 18.93 2.412
Average Monthly Duration 8.203 7.621 4.570 9.118 9.011 3.730
(c) Well Connected vs Less Connected Clients [Across-Client Variation]
Below Median Centrality Above Median Centrality Diff.
Mean Median sd Mean Median sd t-stat
5-day Weighted Performance -0.0591 0 44.75 1.084 0.794 32.10 -4.40***
5-day Unweighted Performance -0.396 -0.0253 40.69 1.206 0.888 28.74 -3.05***
3-day Weighted Performance -0.591 -0.235 34.59 0.696 0.476 24.85 -3.25***
3-day Unweighted Performance -1.020 -0.502 31.61 0.661 0.418 22.14 -2.09**
(d) Well Connected vs Less Connected Months [Within-Client Variation]
Below Median Centrality Above Median Centrality Diff.
Mean Median sd Mean Median sd t-stat
5-day Weighted Performance -0.0909 0.297 41.49 1.445 0.682 35.63 -2.77***
5-day Unweighted Performance -0.224 0.363 37.65 1.326 0.624 32.06 -2.98***
3-day Weighted Performance -0.473 -3.69e-07 32.15 0.828 0.424 27.44 -3.02***
3-day Unweighted Performance -0.648 -0.0521 29.15 0.449 0.221 24.92 -2.72***
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for our baseline sample, covering 2011m10-2017m6, that is collapsed at the
month-client level. Panel A reports summary statistics for all clients. Panel B differentiates between more connected and less
connected clients by placing clients, in each month, into two groups based on whether their first-order centrality measure is
below or above the median in the given month. Panel C and D report summary statistics on unweighted and volume-weighted
performance measures at the 3-day and 5-day horizons, measured in basis points. Panel D places each client observation into
two groups based on the within-variation of connectedness, i.e. depending on whether the client’s first-order centrality measure
is below or above the client’s own median centrality measure based on the whole sample. The last column in Panel C and D
reports the t-statistics associated with the test of whether performance is different for low and high connectivity clients (Panel
C) and for low and high connectivity months (Panel D). Asterisks denote significance levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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7.2 Baseline Results
7.2.1 Monthly Data
Table 2: Client Connectivity and Trading Performance: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0-day 1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.001769*** 0.001864* 0.003291*** 0.003923*** 0.004770*** 0.005074***
Centrality (2.762) (1.808) (2.652) (2.778) (2.740) (2.856)
Volume
-0.000460 -0.000448 0.000419 0.000335 -0.001289 -0.001807
(-0.388) (-0.236) (0.174) (0.116) (-0.426) (-0.506)
Tran.
-0.001155 0.003164 0.000512 -0.002308 -0.004928 -0.004036
(-0.687) (1.122) (0.123) (-0.522) (-0.956) (-0.640)
N 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908
R2 0.056 0.037 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.035
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(a) Turnover-weighted Trading Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0-day 1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.00108* 0.00185* 0.00320*** 0.00334** 0.00456*** 0.00514***
Centrality (1.880) (1.965) (2.749) (2.248) (2.750) (2.975)
Volume
-0.00125 -0.00111 0.00145 0.00284 0.00187 0.00067
(-1.241) (-0.641) (0.636) (1.063) (0.701) (0.208)
Tran.
0.00126 0.00118 -0.00370 -0.00593 -0.00741 -0.00551
(0.693) (0.376) (-0.935) (-1.336) (-1.541) (-1.017)
N 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908
R2 0.092 0.051 0.047 0.044 0.039 0.039
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Unweighted Trading Performance
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in %-points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the
natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level
and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 4: Client Connectivity and the 5-day Performance: Transaction vs Anticipation Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Transaction [Id] Anticip. [Id] Transaction [D] Anticip. [D]
Client 0.00507*** 0.00050 0.00438** 0.00118** 0.00372**
Centrality (2.856) (1.363) (2.564) (2.248) (2.161)
Volume
-0.00181 -0.00098 -0.00116 -0.00193* -0.00037
(-0.506) (-1.458) (-0.321) (-1.821) (-0.100)
Tran.
-0.00404 0.00079 -0.00419 -0.00054 -0.00280
(-0.640) (0.771) (-0.659) (-0.328) (-0.447)
N 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908
R2 0.035 0.073 0.034 0.066 0.034
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(a) Turnover-weighted Trading Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Transaction [Id] Anticip. [Id] Transaction [D] Anticip. [D]
Client 0.00514*** 0.00075** 0.00425** 0.00118*** 0.00371**
Centrality (2.975) (2.375) (2.544) (2.724) (2.282)
Volume
0.00067 -0.00056 0.00122 -0.00122 0.00174
(0.208) (-1.110) (0.378) (-1.561) (0.543)
Tran.
-0.00551 0.00040 -0.00576 -0.00025 -0.00516
(-1.017) (0.397) (-1.083) (-0.176) (-0.983)
N 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908
R2 0.039 0.143 0.035 0.116 0.034
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Unweighted Trading Performance
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at the 5-day horizon
horizons on our connectivity measures (4.5). The decomposition is based on 4.2. The transaction-level data is collapsed at the
client-month level. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client and the natural
logarithm of the number of monthly transactions. To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client
observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard
errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01).
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Table 5: Client Connectivity and Realised Performance
(1) (2)
Full Sample High Transaction Months
Client 0.00372 0.00577**
Centrality (1.357) (2.027)
Volume
-0.00318 -0.00771
(-0.626) (-1.024)
Tran.
-0.00169 -0.00345
(-0.175) (-0.303)
N 15242 9721
R2 0.059 0.073
Time FE Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes
Notes: this table regresses the realised trading performance (5) on our connectivity measures. The transaction-level data is
collapsed at the client-month level. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client
and the natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions. To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level
and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
Figure 6: Decomposing the Baseline Performance into Yield Curve Shifting and Changing
Noise Effects
-
.
01
-
.
00
5
0
.
00
5
.
01
0 10 20 30
TRADING DAYS
Baseline Effects
-
.
01
-
.
00
5
0
.
00
5
.
01
0 10 20 30
TRADING DAYS
Shifting-Curve Effects
-
.
01
-
.
00
5
0
.
00
5
.
01
0 10 20 30
TRADING DAYS
Changing-Noise Effects
Weighted Performance
Notes: this figure plots the estimated β coefficients from variants of our baseline regression 4.5, where we use three measures
of performance according to 4.3: (i) the baseline performance measure, (ii) the yield-curve shift component, and (iii) the noise
component. We estimate the regression up to 30-day horizon (T = 30), using the value weighted performance variable as the
regressand, measured in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client
(“Volume”) and the natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Transactions”). To reduce noise, we winsorise
the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. The
shaded area denotes the 90% confidence band, It is based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month
and the client level.
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Figure 7: Decomposing the Baseline Performance into Yield Curve Shifting and Changing
Noise Effects
Notes: this figure plots the estimated β coefficients from variants of our baseline regression 4.5, where we use three measures
of performance according to 4.3: (i) the baseline performance measure, (ii) the yield-curve shift component, and (iii) the noise
component. We estimate the regression up to 30-day horizon (T = 30), using the value weighted performance variable as the
regressand, measured in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client
(“Volume”) and the natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Transactions”). To reduce noise, we winsorise
the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. The
shaded area denotes the 90% confidence band, It is based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month
and the client level.
7.2.2 Daily Data
Table 6: Client Connectedness at Daily Frequency
Mean Median St.dev Within St.dev N
Connectedness 3.19 3 2.33 1.46 103,199
Note: the table presents summary statistics on client connectedness, defined as the number of dealers a client trades with on
a given trading day. “Within St.dev” is the standard deviation of the estimated residual εi,t from the regression
Connectionsi,t = αi + µt + εi,t. The sample is based on trading days on which a client has more than two transactions.
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Table 7: Client Connectivity and Trading Performance Using Daily Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.00053 0.00087 0.00280** 0.00431*** 0.00281*
Centrality (0.653) (1.007) (2.543) (3.226) (1.923)
Volume
0.00117 0.00146 0.00176 0.00146 0.00231
(1.025) (1.131) (1.188) (0.888) (1.222)
Tran.
-0.00061 -0.00246 -0.00860*** -0.00811** -0.00928**
(-0.270) (-0.898) (-2.619) (-2.101) (-2.293)
N 103565 103565 103565 103565 103565
R2 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.033
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(a) Turnover-weighted Trading Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.00120 0.00148 0.00269** 0.00418*** 0.00301*
Centrality (1.466) (1.566) (2.126) (2.633) (1.905)
Volume
-0.00044 0.00038 0.00102 0.00144 0.00143
(-0.441) (0.318) (0.728) (0.886) (0.780)
Tran.
0.00070 -0.00107 -0.00603 -0.00789* -0.00765
(0.317) (-0.360) (-1.564) (-1.737) (-1.578)
N 103565 103565 103565 103565 103565
R2 0.039 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.036
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Unweighted Trading Performance
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in %-points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the
natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level
and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Figure 8: Daily Performance Regressions over 0-30 day Horizons
(a) All Trading Days
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Notes: Panel a plots the estimated β coefficients from our baseline regression 4.5 up to 30-day horizon (T = 30), using the value
weighted performance variable as the regressand, measured in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the
pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the natural logarithm of the number of daily transactions (“Transactions”).
Panel b plots the results after including a dummy (interacted with connectedness) indicating the trading days that coincided
with MPC announcements and release of inflation data. To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use
month-client observations that are based on at least three daily transactions. The shaded area denotes the 90% confidence
band, It is based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the day and the client level.
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7.3 Connectivity and Covariance
7.3.1 Monthly Data
Table 8: Unweighted Trading Performance on High and Low Covariance Days
3-day Covariance 5-day Covariance
1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf 1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf
γ 0.0230*** 0.0134** 0.0023 0.0225*** 0.0227*** 0.0135*
(4.218) (2.246) (0.360) (3.161) (3.511) (1.750)
N 34868 34722 34626 34868 34722 34626
R2 0.530 0.525 0.516 0.534 0.533 0.517
(a) Total Flow Covariance
3-day Covariance 5-day Covariance
1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf 1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf
γ 0.0379*** 0.0304*** 0.0059 0.0368*** 0.0389*** 0.0198
(4.921) (3.650) (0.671) (3.154) (3.172) (1.446)
N 35012 34856 34648 35012 34856 34648
R2 0.528 0.516 0.509 0.528 0.522 0.510
(b) Across Segment Flow Covariance
3-day Covariance 5-day Covariance
1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf 1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf
γ 0.0009 -0.0029 -0.0010 0.0035 0.0029 0.0007
(0.219) (-0.579) (-0.179) (0.588) (0.493) (0.098)
N 34934 34736 34628 34934 34736 34628
R2 0.521 0.527 0.516 0.530 0.533 0.521
(c) Within Segment Flow Covariance
Notes: this table regresses the unweighted trading performance at different time horizons on a dummy taking value 1 if the
performance measure is based on high-covariance trades and 0 if it is based on low-covariance days (5.6). The three panels differ
in terms of how the covariance is computed, corresponding to formulae 5.2, 5.1 and 5.3, respectively. The transaction-level
data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures are in percentage points. We winsorise the sample at the
1%-level and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses
are based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance
levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 9: Weighted Trading Performance on High and Low Covariance Days
3-day Covariance 5-day Covariance
1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf 1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf
γ 0.0250*** 0.0107 -0.0017 0.0245*** 0.0217*** 0.0137
(4.326) (1.618) (-0.231) (3.144) (2.851) (1.554)
N 34868 34722 34626 34868 34722 34626
R2 0.519 0.518 0.510 0.521 0.521 0.507
(a) Total Flow Covariance
3-day Covariance 5-day Covariance
1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf 1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf
γ 0.0417*** 0.0297*** 0.0074 0.0415*** 0.0412*** 0.0244
(5.117) (3.192) (0.765) (3.539) (3.235) (1.622)
N 35012 34856 34648 35012 34856 34648
R2 0.519 0.500 0.496 0.519 0.507 0.496
(b) Across Segment Flow Covariance
3-day Covariance 5-day Covariance
1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf 1-day Perf 3-day Perf 5-day Perf
γ 0.0022 -0.0048 -0.0034 0.0043 0.0030 0.0012
(0.440) (-0.924) (-0.536) (0.621) (0.423) (0.141)
N 34934 34736 34628 34934 34736 34628
R2 0.517 0.518 0.511 0.519 0.526 0.514
(c) Within Segment Flow Covariance
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted trading performance at different time horizons on a dummy taking value 1 if the
performance measure is based on high-covariance trades and 0 if it is based on low-covariance days (5.6). The three panels differ
in terms of how the covariance is computed, corresponding to formulae 5.2, 5.1 and 5.3, respectively. The transaction-level
data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures are in percentage points. We winsorise the sample at the
1%-level and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses
are based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance
levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
41
Table 10: Client Connectivity and Covariance with the Aggregate Order Flow
1-Day 3-Day 5-Day
Client 0.00623* 0.00206 -0.00068
Centrality (1.684) (0.483) (-0.159)
Size
-0.00834 -0.00756 -0.00306
(-1.042) (-0.927) (-0.360)
Intensity
0.01316 0.02825** 0.02261
(0.993) (2.030) (1.586)
N 20289 20284 20279
R2 0.033 0.031 0.028
Month/Client FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
(a) Total Client Order Flow
Own GEMMs’ Order Flow Rest of GEMMs’ Order Flow
1-Day 3-Day 5-Day 1-Day 3-Day 5-Day
Client 0.01007** 0.01030** 0.01086** 0.00265 0.00043 -0.00376
Centrality (2.089) (2.091) (2.195) (0.568) (0.088) (-0.839)
Volume
-0.00480 -0.00969 -0.00612 -0.00765 -0.00986 -0.00523
(-0.490) (-0.915) (-0.617) (-0.915) (-1.257) (-0.624)
Tran.
0.02565* 0.01916 0.00795 0.00613 0.02354* 0.01819
(1.723) (1.127) (0.517) (0.402) (1.780) (1.453)
N 19410 19407 19404 19410 19407 19404
R2 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.030 0.034 0.030
Month/Client FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
(b) Total Client Order Flow via Own GEMMS vs Non-own GEMMs
Regular Client-GEMM Connections New Client-GEMM Connections
1-Day 3-Day 5-Day 1-Day 3-Day 5-Day
Client 0.00781* 0.01253** 0.00848* 0.00693* -0.00033 0.00709
Centrality (1.707) (2.596) (1.808) (1.732) (-0.084) (1.646)
Volume
0.00412 0.00204 0.00359 0.00163 -0.00934 -0.01390
(0.518) (0.250) (0.409) (0.157) (-0.969) (-1.426)
Tran.
0.01137 0.00075 -0.00540 0.00326 0.02653* 0.02233
(0.808) (0.055) (-0.380) (0.225) (1.769) (1.514)
N 18932 18929 18926 18932 18929 18926
R2 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.028 0.028 0.030
Month/Client FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
(c) Total Client Order Flow via Own GEMMS: Regular vs New Connections
Notes: this table regresses different versions of the covariance measure 5.2 on our connectivity measure and controls (5.7). The
transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures are in basis points. In Panel (a) the
outcome variable is the client’s covariance with the aggregate client order flow in the market. In Panel (b) the outcome variable
if the client’s covariance with the aggregate order flow intermediated by the dealers that the client is connected to (columns
1-3), and by all other dealers (columns 4-6). In Panel (c), the outcome variable is the client’s covariance with the aggregate
order flow intermediated by the dealers that the client is regularly trades with (columns 1-3) and by all other dealers that the
client trades with in the given month but not in the previous month. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound
trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce
noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in
the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the
client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 11: Client Connectivity and Covariance with the Aggregate Order Flow: The Role of
High Performance Sensitivity Clients
Total Market Order Flow
1-Day 3-Day 5-Day
Centrality -0.00548 -0.00359 -0.00483
(-0.964) (-0.560) (-0.826)
Centrality×DHβ 0.01663*** 0.00707 0.00300
(4.036) (1.539) (0.573)
Volume
-0.00859 -0.00768 -0.00315
(-1.075) (-0.940) (-0.368)
Tran.
0.01342 0.02838** 0.02271
(1.021) (2.047) (1.595)
N 20289 20284 20279
R2 0.034 0.031 0.028
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table regresses the covariance measure 5.2 (with the aggregate market order flow) on our connectivity measure
interacted with a dummy indicating high-β clients as well as other controls (5.9). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the
client-month level. The performance measures are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound
trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce
noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in
the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the
client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
Table 12: Client Connectivity and Covariance with the Aggregate Order Flow: The Role of
High Performance Sensitivity Clients
Own GEMMs’ Order Flow Rest of GEMMs’ Order Flow
1-Day 3-Day 5-Day 1-Day 3-Day 5-Day
Centrality -0.00262 0.00041 0.00159 -0.00250 -0.00421 -0.00807
(-0.367) (0.064) (0.249) (-0.421) (-0.631) (-1.344)
Centrality×DHβ 0.02296*** 0.02041*** 0.01969*** 0.00732 0.00441 -0.00033
(4.682) (3.523) (3.217) (1.357) (0.944) (-0.068)
Volume
-0.00502 -0.01280 -0.00846 -0.00864 -0.01442* -0.00539
(-0.509) (-1.238) (-0.865) (-1.009) (-1.806) (-0.626)
Tran.
0.02296 0.02034 0.00889 0.00724 0.02959** 0.01931
(1.528) (1.196) (0.576) (0.475) (2.276) (1.539)
N 18932 18929 18926 18932 18929 18926
R2 0.037 0.032 0.034 0.031 0.034 0.031
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table the covariance measure 5.2 (with the aggregate market order flow intermediated by the client’s own dealers
(columns 1-3) and by all the other dealers (columns 4-6)) on our connectivity measure interacted with a dummy indicating
high-β clients as well as other controls (5.9). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance
measures are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”)
and the natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the
1%-level and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses
are based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance
levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 13: Client Connectivity and Covariance with the Aggregate Order Flow: The Role of
High Performance Sensitivity Clients
Regular Client-GEMM Connections New Client-GEMM Connections
1-Day 3-Day 5-Day 1-Day 3-Day 5-Day
Centrality -0.00373 0.00406 -0.00049 0.00051 -0.00812 0.00269
(-0.498) (0.608) (-0.071) (0.104) (-1.620) (0.523)
Centrality×DHβ 0.01817*** 0.02012*** 0.01652*** 0.01269** 0.00666 0.01104*
(4.092) (3.532) (3.093) (2.380) (1.116) (1.692)
Volume
0.00391 0.00188 0.00343 0.00151 -0.00948 -0.01398
(0.491) (0.232) (0.390) (0.146) (-0.985) (-1.433)
Tran.
0.01167 0.00097 -0.00517 0.00343 0.02673* 0.02244
(0.832) (0.071) (-0.365) (0.238) (1.792) (1.527)
N 18932 18929 18926 18932 18929 18926
R2 0.038 0.033 0.033 0.028 0.028 0.030
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table the covariance measure 5.2 (with the aggregate market order flow intermediated by the client’s regular
connections (columns 1-3) and by new connections dealers (columns 4-6)) on our connectivity measure interacted with a
dummy indicating high-β clients as well as other controls (5.9). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month
level. The performance measures are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume
of each client (“Volume”) and the natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we
winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month.
T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level.
Asterisks denote significance levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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7.3.2 Daily Data
Table 14: Weighted Trading Performance on Trading Days with High Covariance with the
Total Market Order Flow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
QTotali,t = 1 0.01814*** 0.02550*** 0.02838*** 0.02573*** 0.02309***
(4.754) (5.239) (4.733) (3.715) (2.998)
Volume
0.00181 0.00211 0.00254* 0.00234 0.00316*
(1.499) (1.580) (1.706) (1.405) (1.683)
Tran.
-0.00081 -0.00243 -0.00633** -0.00390 -0.00671*
(-0.387) (-0.916) (-2.163) (-1.137) (-1.947)
N 105190 105190 105190 105190 105190
R2 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.033
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(a) Covariance with 1-day Ahead
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
QTotali,t = 1 -0.00133 0.00984** 0.02138*** 0.02291*** 0.02676***
(-0.372) (2.087) (3.641) (3.344) (3.554)
Volume
0.00185 0.00213 0.00251* 0.00230 0.00308
(1.528) (1.581) (1.662) (1.367) (1.630)
Tran.
-0.00062 -0.00224 -0.00623** -0.00382 -0.00661*
(-0.293) (-0.839) (-2.099) (-1.106) (-1.905)
N 105041 105041 105041 105041 105041
R2 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.033
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Covariance with 3-day Ahead
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in %-points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the
natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level
and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 15: Weighted Trading Performance on Trading Days with High Covariance with the
Market Order Flow Intermediated by Own Dealers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
QOwni,t = 1 0.00673*** 0.00841** 0.00963** 0.01054** 0.01238***
(2.753) (2.447) (2.351) (2.338) (2.630)
Volume
0.00134 0.00158 0.00221 0.00206 0.00284
(1.126) (1.168) (1.426) (1.186) (1.442)
Tran.
-0.00006 -0.00160 -0.00565* -0.00395 -0.00704*
(-0.026) (-0.579) (-1.865) (-1.098) (-1.931)
N 103103 103103 103103 103103 103103
R2 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.033
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(a) Covariance with 1-day Ahead
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
QOwni,t = 1 -0.00199 0.00194 0.00653* 0.01069** 0.01071**
(-0.896) (0.598) (1.673) (2.478) (2.299)
Volume
0.00134 0.00157 0.00218 0.00204 0.00281
(1.115) (1.153) (1.397) (1.166) (1.422)
Tran.
0.00009 -0.00147 -0.00558* -0.00390 -0.00692*
(0.042) (-0.531) (-1.819) (-1.074) (-1.882)
N 102958 102958 102958 102958 102958
R2 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Covariance with 3-day Ahead
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in %-points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the
natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level
and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 16: Client Connectivity and Covariance with the Aggregate Order Flow
1-Day 3-Day 5-Day
Client 0.00476** 0.00043 -0.00005
Centrality (2.291) (0.226) (-0.018)
Size
0.00543*** 0.00407** 0.00322*
(2.825) (2.269) (1.688)
Intensity
0.01543*** 0.01489*** 0.01231*
(2.634) (2.595) (1.904)
N 103094 102949 102816
R2 0.024 0.025 0.023
Month/Client FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
(a) Total Client Order Flow
Traded with Dealers on Trading Day Traded with Dealers only
as well as During Past 10 Days on Trading Day
1-Day 3-Day 5-Day 1-Day 3-Day 5-Day
Client 0.00667*** 0.00499*** 0.00264* -0.00019 -0.00074 -0.00064
Centrality (2.866) (3.602) (1.682) (-0.245) (-0.740) (-0.620)
Size
0.00374** 0.00114 0.00265** 0.00004 -0.00006 -0.00066
(2.526) (0.975) (2.135) (0.050) (-0.062) (-0.763)
Intensity
0.00893* 0.00354 0.00162 0.00245 0.00239 -0.00067
(1.796) (0.889) (0.375) (1.523) (1.222) (-0.365)
N 103103 102958 102825 103103 102958 102825
R2 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.022
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Total Client Order Flow via Own Dealers
Notes: this table regresses different versions of the covariance measure 5.2 on our connectivity measure and controls (5.7). The
transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures are in basis points. We include as a
control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the natural logarithm of the number
of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client observations
that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors, using
two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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7.4 Macroeconomic Announcements
Table 17: Economic Announcements
Announcement Source
Cumulated Number of
Announcement Days
Panel A: Core Announcements
UK Inflation Report Bank of England
127UK MPC Minutes Bank of England
UK MPC Decision Bank of England
UK Inflation Rate ONS 196
Panel B: Additional Announcements
UK Earnings/Unemployment ONS
356UK Manufacturing ONS
UK GDP ONS
US FOMC Minutes Federal Reserve
422
US FOMC Statement Federal Reserve
Notes: The table lists the major macroeconomic announcements that our analysis focuses on. Panel A lists the announcements
related to UK nominal variables that we use for our benchmark analysis. Panel B includes additional announcements related
to UK real variables and US monetary policy decisions. The third column denotes the cumulated number of trading days in
our sample that coincide with macroeconomic announcements. In total, our sample includes 1470 trading days.
Table 18: Turnover-weighted Performance: Trading Days With and Without Inflation &
Monetary Policy News
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Centrality 0.00185* 0.00302** 0.00308* 0.00473** 0.00437**
(1.680) (2.106) (1.874) (2.508) (2.074)
Centrality×ANN ′ 0.00108 0.00153* 0.00308*** 0.00289** 0.00249*
(1.626) (1.949) (3.257) (2.449) (1.702)
Size
0.00130 0.00235 0.00379 0.00261 0.00165
(0.712) (1.009) (1.356) (0.905) (0.483)
Intensity
0.00033 -0.00231 -0.00816* -0.01075** -0.00676
(0.098) (-0.509) (-1.673) (-2.047) (-1.130)
N 34621 34621 34621 34621 34621
R2 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.023
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the
natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level
and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 19: Turnover-weighted Performance: Trading Days With and Without Inflation &
Monetary Policy News
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
βANN ′ 0.00108 0.00146* 0.00233** 0.00230* -0.00213
(1.592) (1.738) (2.263) (1.877) (1.436)
N 27312 27312 27312 27312 27312
R2 0.503 0.509 0.516 0.520 0.521
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the
natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level
and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Appendix
A Additional Tables and Figures
Table 20: Client Connectivity and Trading Performance: Excluding Client Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0-day 1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.00207*** 0.00157*** 0.00234*** 0.00212** 0.00218** 0.00209**
Centrality (5.683) (2.707) (2.968) (2.488) (2.416) (2.150)
Volume
0.00324*** 0.00268** 0.00260** 0.00226* 0.00264** 0.00283*
(4.741) (2.536) (2.072) (1.731) (1.999) (1.896)
Transactions
-0.00619*** -0.00299 -0.00476* -0.00378 -0.00588** -0.00502
(-5.573) (-1.620) (-1.957) (-1.420) (-2.026) (-1.481)
N 20909 20909 20909 20909 20909 20909
R2 0.013 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE No No No No No No
(a) Turnover-weighted Trading Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0-day 1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.00270*** 0.00263*** 0.00329*** 0.00326*** 0.00352*** 0.00374***
Centrality (6.268) (4.511) (4.621) (3.902) (4.105) (4.037)
Volume
0.00427*** 0.00425*** 0.00454*** 0.00396*** 0.00414*** 0.00391**
(5.767) (4.143) (3.635) (2.851) (2.954) (2.453)
Transactions
-0.00888*** -0.00787*** -0.01007*** -0.00944*** -0.01120*** -0.01087***
(-5.767) (-4.110) (-4.464) (-3.732) (-4.037) (-3.480)
N 20909 20909 20909 20909 20909 20909
R2 0.024 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE No No No No No No
(b) Unweighted Trading Performance
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client and the natural
logarithm of the number of monthly transactions. To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client
observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard
errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01).
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Table 21: Client Connectivity and Trading Performance: Including Public Clients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0-day 1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.001540*** 0.001530 0.002873** 0.003267** 0.003943** 0.003924**
Centrality (2.661) (1.613) (2.547) (2.492) (2.441) (2.379)
Volume
-0.000678 -0.000695 -0.000136 -0.000086 -0.001696 -0.002134
(-0.590) (-0.384) (-0.059) (-0.031) (-0.572) (-0.617)
Transactions
-0.000658 0.004243 0.001879 -0.000739 -0.002751 -0.001692
(-0.401) (1.584) (0.471) (-0.175) (-0.550) (-0.277)
N 22912 22912 22912 22912 22912 22912
R2 0.055 0.038 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.035
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(a) Turnover-weighted Trading Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0-day 1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.00089* 0.00157* 0.00286*** 0.00288** 0.00386** 0.00411**
Centrality (1.719) (1.819) (2.749) (2.137) (2.550) (2.579)
Volume
-0.00149 -0.00126 0.00095 0.00253 0.00137 0.00013
(-1.509) (-0.752) (0.427) (0.980) (0.525) (0.042)
Transactions
0.00144 0.00188 -0.00227 -0.00434 -0.00513 -0.00293
(0.827) (0.628) (-0.598) (-1.031) (-1.112) (-0.562)
N 22912 22912 22912 22912 22912 22912
R2 0.088 0.051 0.047 0.044 0.039 0.038
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Unweighted Trading Performance
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client and the natural
logarithm of the number of monthly transactions. To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client
observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard
errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01).
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Table 22: Client Connectivity and Trading Performance: Using Eigenvalue-Centrality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0-day 1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.342764*** 0.352475* 0.699551*** 0.831766*** 0.969849*** 1.021515***
Centrality (2.740) (1.732) (2.765) (2.864) (2.797) (2.785)
Volume
-0.000475 -0.000457 0.000343 0.000246 -0.001365 -0.001879
(-0.401) (-0.239) (0.142) (0.084) (-0.448) (-0.523)
Transactions
-0.001043 0.003335 0.000339 -0.002501 -0.004908 -0.003951
(-0.630) (1.187) (0.082) (-0.575) (-0.965) (-0.634)
N 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908
R2 0.056 0.037 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.036
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE No No No No No No
(a) Turnover-weighted Trading Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0-day 1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Client 0.23053** 0.38297** 0.66432*** 0.66936** 0.85334** 0.99639***
Centrality (1.996) (2.044) (2.787) (2.186) (2.541) (2.853)
Volume
-0.00128 -0.00115 0.00138 0.00279 0.00186 0.00063
(-1.265) (-0.658) (0.606) (1.039) (0.692) (0.193)
Transactions
0.00120 0.00114 -0.00377 -0.00586 -0.00694 -0.00520
(0.667) (0.370) (-0.962) (-1.342) (-1.453) (-0.978)
N 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908 20908
R2 0.092 0.051 0.048 0.044 0.039 0.039
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client FE No No No No No No
(b) Unweighted Trading Performance
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client and the natural
logarithm of the number of monthly transactions. To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level and use month-client
observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard
errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01).
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A.1 Announcements Including News About US FOMC and UK
Real Variables
Table 23: Turnover-weighted Performance: Trading Days With and Without Inflation &
Monetary Policy News; Including News About UK Real Variables and US Monetary Policy
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
Centrality 0.00217** 0.00268** 0.00275* 0.00367** 0.00326
(2.182) (2.065) (1.839) (2.140) (1.630)
Centrality×ANN ′ 0.00069 0.00137** 0.00256*** 0.00180** 0.00192
(1.182) (2.166) (3.151) (2.061) (1.635)
Size
0.00049 0.00269 0.00463* 0.00356 0.00225
(0.299) (1.225) (1.763) (1.260) (0.724)
Intensity
0.00051 -0.00156 -0.00646 -0.00714 -0.00346
(0.190) (-0.416) (-1.579) (-1.649) (-0.652)
N 37871 37871 37871 37871 37871
R2 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.022
Client FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the
natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level
and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
Table 24: Turnover-weighted Performance: Trading Days With and Without Inflation &
Monetary Policy News; Including News About UK Real Variables and US Monetary Policy
1-day 2-day 3-day 4-day 5-day
βANN ′ 0.00065 0.00140** 0.00204** 0.00153* 0.00185*
(1.120) (2.335) (2.523) (1.832) (1.668)
N 33812 33812 33812 33812 33812
R2 0.506 0.512 0.520 0.527 0.525
Notes: this table regresses the value-weighted (panel A) and unweighted (panel B) trading performance at different time horizons
on our connectivity measures (4.5). The transaction-level data is collapsed at the client-month level. The performance measures
are in basis points. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the pound trade volume of each client (“Volume”) and the
natural logarithm of the number of monthly transactions (“Tran.”). To reduce noise, we winsorise the sample at the 1%-level
and use month-client observations that are based on at least 2 transactions in the month. T-statistics in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors, using two-way clustering at the month and the client level. Asterisks denote significance levels (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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B Theoretical Model
Consider rounds of trading of an asset with a value of Vt = 0, 1 with equal probability
in each round. Let Vt be uncorrelated across periods. The trading protocol is a modified
version of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Traders can seek bid and ask quotes from one or
more risk neutral, competitive market maker (MM) in each round. Sampling quotes from
more market makers is costly. After observing the quotes, they can decide whether to buy
or sell a unit in each round.
To convey the intuition we focus on the simplest possible case.
A client i = 1, 2, is assigned to two potential MMs. With respect to i, we index the
MMs as mi = R,N, for regular and new comer. For simplicity, we assume that the set of
assigned MMs are disjunct across the two clients. Client i is present in the market at t with
probability (1− α). With probability α, a liquidity trader arrives instead to each of the
MMs, mi. The liquidity trader requests a quote and buys or sells with equal chance from
his MM. The MMs do not know which of the two types arrive in a given period. Client i’s
signal, s = H,L is informative:
Pr (V = 1|s = H) = 12 + ∆ti
where ∆ti > 0 might vary across clients and time. ∆ti is observable for MMs. Before trading,
the client decides whether to seek quotes from N as well, additional to the quote she observes
from R. The additional quote costs c. In case she does so, she observes the quotes and picks
an MM to trade with. In this case, the other MM does not trade. In periods when the client
is present but does not seek quotes from N , a liquidity trader arrives instead and requests
a quote and trades randomly.15 After trading, positions are liquidated at the realised true
value Vt.
The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium in this stage game.
Proposition 2 Let
∆¯ = (α + 1)(α + 2) (1− α)c
be within the support of ∆ti.
1. If ∆ti < ∆¯, the informed trader trade only with R and the equilibrium bid ask quotes
15 We make this assumption to ensure that regardless of the type of the trader and the decision of
the informed, MMs are requested to provide exactly one quote. Hence, number of requests do not reveal
information for the MM.
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are
AR
(
∆ti < ∆¯
)
= 12 + ∆ti (1− α)
BR
(
∆ti < ∆¯
)
= 12 −∆ti (1− α)
AN
(
∆ti < ∆¯
)
= BN
(
∆ti < ∆¯
)
= 12 .
2. If ∆ti > ∆¯, the informed trader seeks quotes from both MM and trades with each with
equal probability. The equilibrium bid ask quotes are
AR
(
∆ti > ∆¯
)
= AN
(
∆ti > ∆¯
)
= 12 + ∆ti
(1− α)
1 + α
BR
(
∆ti > ∆¯
)
= BN
(
∆ti > ∆¯
)
= 12 −∆ti
(1− α)
1 + α .
Proof. The quotes are derived by Bayes Rule. For example,
AR1
(
∆ti < ∆¯
)
= E
(
Vt| a buy in t, R,∆ < ∆¯
)
=
=
(
α 12 + (1− α)
(
1
2 + ∆ti
))
1
2(
α 12 + (1− α)
(
1
2 + ∆ti
))
1
2 +
(
α 12 + (1− α)
(
1−
(
1
2 + ∆ti
)))
1
2
= 12 + ∆ti (1− α) .
When the trader observes quotes from both MMs, in equilibrium the two MMs has to
submit the same quotes given the mixed strategy of acceptance from the trader. For this,
the informed trader has to mix with probability half. Thus,
AR1
(
∆ti > ∆¯
)
= E
(
Vt| a buy in t, R,∆ > ∆¯
)
=
=
(
α 12 + (1− α)
(
1
2 + ∆ti
)
1
2
)
1
2(
α 12 + (1− α)
(
1
2 + ∆ti∆
)
1
2
)
1
2 +
(
α 12 + (1− α)
(
1−
(
1
2 + ∆ti
))
1
2
)
1
2
= 12+∆ti
(1− α)
1 + α .
∆¯ is derived by the indifference condition given c and the different quotes under the strategies
of seeking and not seeking quotes from N .
To picture the implied time-series and cross-sectional evaluation of prices and trades, we
assume that for each client i, this subgame is repeated in many time-periods. These games
are independent from each other because all random variables are redrawn in each period
and because the MMs are disjunct across the two clients. Suppose that ∆ti is driven by a
two-state Markov process, with states ∆H ,∆L and ∆H > ∆¯ > ∆L and suppose that
∆H
∆L
< 1 + α. (B.1)
The correlation structure across time and clients in ∆ti can be arbitrary.
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To see the implications, note first that in intervals where the state is mostly ∆H , clients
connectedness is higher. This is so, because in state ∆H they trade with both MMs with
equal chance. Therefore, the connectedness of client i is a proxy for better information for
client i. Also, in state ∆H the client has higher expected profit for two separate reasons.
First, with more precise information she anticipates the true value of V with higher precision.
That is, she tends to buy when Vt = 1. Second, as long as condition (B.1) holds, her price
impact is smaller as she can hide her information better.16
Suppose that announcements proxy for periods, when ∆it is high for both clients. In
this case, the average effect of connectedness on performance is higher, as both clients are
in the high-centrality group, and only liquidity traders are in the low connectedness group.
These observations are summarized in Corollary 1.
16Condition (B.1) is necessary, because the bid-ask spread is influenced by two forces. When private
information is more precise, adverse sellection is stronger, which increases bid-ask spreads in the ∆H state.
However, in that state, the client mixes between the two market makers, which reduces the bid-ask spread.
Under (B.1) the latter dominates.
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